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Richard J. Kraus * 






 A person who performs services as an employee may 
deduct unreimbursed expenses in the performance of those 
services. The miscellaneous itemized deductions section of 
Form 1040, Schedule A, permits a list of those deductions on 
that form or on an attached document. These itemized 
deductions, however, are subject to certain limitations: they 
must exceed 2% of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income 
(AGI)1; and the taxpayer may have alternative minimum tax 
requirements.2 
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On the other hand, a person who performs services as a 
statutory employee within any of four categories including 
drivers, full-time life insurance sales agents, work-at-home 
individuals and full-time traveling salesperson3 or an 
independent contractor may deduct business expenses through 
the use of Form 1040, Schedule C, without any limitation 
imposed on the miscellaneous itemized deductions and without 
the adverse ramifications of the alternative minimum tax with 
respect to those deductions. 
 
 This article examines the advantages and disadvantages 
of requirements to use Schedule A or Schedule C, the 
definitions of common law employee and independent 
contractor and a number of recent cases which assist the 
professional tax counselor in formulating a plan of advice for 
clients. These clients include workers in the following 
businesses: teaching, building and construction, trucking, 
computers, automobiles, attorneys, taxi cab drivers and 
salespersons. The article concludes with a specific plan for 
assisting clients who face the tax dilemma of working as 
consultants or advisors for businesses. 
 
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF TAX 
STATUS 
 
 While independent contractors and statutory employees 
may use Schedule C to claim business deductions, these 
persons will be subject to pay self-employment tax upon the 
profits gained from the business, if the party for whom they 
work has not already paid those taxes.4  On the other hand, as 
already indicated, common law employees are subject to the 
2% AGI limitation. The range of deductions on Schedule C, 
however, noticeably list expenses such as advertising, fees, 
contract labor, depletion, employee benefits, insurance, 
mortgage payments, professional fees, office expenses, rents, 
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repairs, supplies, utilities and wages which are not contained 
on Schedule A. This schedule emphasizes unreimbursed 
employee expenses such as job travel, job education, vehicle 
expenses and meals and entertainment, which may also be 
claimed on Schedule C.5 A worker usually prefers to claim 
independent contractor or statutory employee status so as to be 
able to deduct a wide range of expenses associated with the 
worker’s business activity. 
 
DEFINITIONS: COMMON LAW EMPLOYEE; 
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR 
 
 The Code, as has been noted above, explicitly defines 
and describes a statutory employee as an individual who 
usually belongs within one of four categories: driver, life 
insurance sales agent, home worker, full-time traveling 
salesperson. Statutory employees receive a W-2 form on which 
their status is noted.6 This article concentrates upon the 
distinction between common law employee and independent 
contractor. 
 
Common Law Employee 
 
 Although the Internal Revenue Code assesses income 
tax against taxpayers who perform services as an employee, the 
Code nowhere defines the term “employee” so that the 
common law rules apply to the definition.7 Many specific facts 
and circumstances assist in the determination of the employee 
status. The degree of control exercised over the employee by 
the employer or principal is paramount; but the cases also 
weigh other relevant factors: worker investment in the work 
facility, the possibility of individual profit or loss, payment to 
the worker by the job or by the time, the power of the principal 
to discharge an individual without the payment of any damages 
other than back wages and other contractually agreed amounts, 
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the principal’s regular business activity, the permanency of the 
work relationship, the perception of the parties about the 






 The common law and statutes define an “independent 
contractor” as one who works for another, but the independent 
contractor has the right to control the means and methods of 
completing the work requested. The principal only has the right 
to control or direct the result of the work and may refuse to pay 
if not reasonably satisfied.9  
 
The Tax Court often examines the substance of the 
relationship between the principal and the one who is working. 
It does not matter if the individual is employed part-time rather 
than full-time and no distinction is made between classes of 
employees so that officers of corporations, managers and other 
supervisory personnel are all employees. The only exception to 
this treatment concerns temporary leased staffing services that 
provide secretaries, nurses, and other trained workers on a 
temporary basis – these leased employees work for the staffing 
services who supply them.  
 
 In addition to statutory employees, furthermore, the 
Code lists statutory non-employees such as direct sellers, real 
estate agents and certain companion sitters employed on a fee 
basis and who work under a written contract designating them 
as non-employees. It should be noted that direct sellers include 
sellers of consumer products from their own homes or places of 
business, sellers engaged in delivering or distributing 
newspapers and others who earn income based on the 
productivity of their direct sales.10  
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CONTROVERSIES: OPPORTUNITIES FOR A PLAN 
 
 Many Tax Court cases have applied the statutory 
criteria to determine the tax status of a worker. Court 
applications concentrate upon controversies which present 
opportunities to understand and appreciate the necessary 
complexity of Code rules and to frame a plan of action for tax 
clients.  
 
Rosato v. Commissioner11 
 
 In 1975 Thomas Rosato signed a contract with the O.C. 
Tanner Company to work as a salesperson for its products and 
services which assist companies to develop programs for 
recognizing and rewarding their employees. Mr. Rosato 
worked the New York City area sales territory in accord with 
this agreement which designated him as the company’s 
employee, subject to an anti-competition clause, who was to 
devote his full time and best efforts to the service of the 
company. Rosato was permitted to participate in Tanner’s 
retirement plan and its medical insurance and group term life 
insurance plans. Additionally, during the tax year 2006, at issue 
in this case, Rosato managed Tanner’s regional office in the 
city; he supervised salespersons, secretaries and other 
personnel whom Tanner had hired. Rosato was required to, and 
did, attend company meetings and training sessions and he was 
often present at the company’s New York City office, but 
Tanner considered him to be an at-will employee. 
 
 The agreement noted, however, that Rosato was to pay 
all expenses in excess of his expense allowance and would not 
be reimbursed for these expenses. Tanner did not set Rosato’s 
work hours or instruct him when to work and he was permitted 
to perform some of his sales work from his home. Rosato paid 
a portion of his office rent, half the cost of his personal 
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secretary and of his own personal assistant; Rosato also paid 
commissions to other Tanner salespersons from his own 
commissions. Rosato did not receive reimbursements from 
Tanner for all of the business expenses which he reported on 
his monthly regional expense report, including phone, utility, 
postage, customer entertainment, office supplies and meal 
expenses. 
 
 For all of the tax years prior to 2006, Rosato had filed 
Form 1040 with Schedule A attached requesting deductions for 
unreimbursed employee expenses. For the 2006 tax year, 
however, Rosato left Form 1040, line 7, “Wages, salaries, tips, 
etc.” blank and used Schedule C, “Profit of loss from 
Business,” in order to report gross receipts and sales of 
$468,378. Rosato decided upon this plan of action even though 
he had received a Form W-2 Wage and Tax Statement from 
Tanner which had not checked the “statutory employee” box 
on the form’s face.  
 
 The court agreed with the IRS determination that 
Rosato was a common law employee despite Rosato’s 
arguments that he was either a statutory employee or an 
independent contractor.12  
 
 The court reasoned that an individual taxpayer may 
qualify as a statutory employee only if the individual is not a 
common law employee. The court then used the series of 
criteria mentioned above to determine Rosato’s status: 
 
Control: The Company exercised a good deal of control over 
Rosato: he was required to attend sales meetings, maintain an 
office presence and not compete; superiors at Tanner 
supervised his work. 
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The Perception of the Parties: Tanner and Rosato entered a 
written contract in 1975 which was superseded by a Golden 
Rule principle oral agreement in 1984, which honored the 
terms of the written agreement. Both the written and oral 
agreements named Rosato as an employee with specific 
salesperson’s duties and as a worker who would receive Form 
W-2 at the end of the work year. 
 
Worker Investment in the Work Facility: Rosato had to 
contribute to office rent and to the payment of office workers, 
but this factor must be weighed against other determinants. In 
addition, the court observed that there were no detailed terms 
for this arrangement and that it was Rosato’s personal decision 
to incur additional costs by hiring a secretary and 
administrative assistant. Rosato did claim that he worked from 
his home on occasion, but he never presented any evidence of 
expenses to establish a home office.  
 
The Possibility of Individual Profit or Loss: Rosato was not 
paid a wage but was awarded commissions; additionally, 
because he shared expenses with Tanner he did risk a net loss if 
his profits did not exceed those expenses. 
 
The Provision of Employee Benefits: The contract between 
Rosato and Tanner included retirement plan participation, 
medical and life insurance plans and unemployment insurance; 
Rosato obviously received benefits and, despite indications of 
an independent contractor status, the reception of these benefits 
strongly indicates an employer-employee relationship. 
 
Payment to the Worker by the Job or by the Time: The court 
observed that Rosato’s pay came from the commissions for his 
sales activity and was not based upon time; Rosato, in fact, 
could set his own time schedule. 
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The Principal’s Regular Business Activity: The court relied 
strongly upon the fact that Rosato was engaged solely in the 
regular business activity of Tanner and that he could not 
compete with them in any similar business; such a fact strongly 
indicates his employee status. 
 
The Permanency of the Work Relationship: The facts indicate 
that Rosato had been working for Tanner since 1975; thirty- 
one years of employment, of receipts of W-2 forms for that 
entire time indicated to the court that the work relationship was 
quite permanent. 
 
The Power of the Principal to Discharge an Individual: Tanner 
considered Rosato to be an employee at will and retained the 
right to discharge him at any time; this fact again strongly 
indicates an employer-employee relationship. 
 
Feaster v. Commissioner13 
 
 A second Tax Court decision held that an accountant 
acted as a common law employee rather than an independent 
contractor. Daniel Feaster could not use Schedule C but was 
required to list the unreimbursed business expenses on 
Schedule A.  
 
 From 2002 to 2009, Feaster performed field auditing 
services for William Langer and Associates of South Carolina. 
He had provided his employer with a completed W-4 form, 
Employee’s Withholding Allowance Certificate, and W-2s had 
been issued to him throughout his time of employment. 
Feaster’s employee job description set time limits on the 
performance of his work, its quality, his customer charges, his 
progress reports and his submission of weekly itineraries. 
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His job description indicated that cases were to be 
completed and that federal, state, county and city taxes would 
be deducted from the billable hours for which he was paid. 
During the 2006 tax year, at issue in this case, Langer paid 
Feaster $29,650 in wages and withheld federal income, Social 
Security and Medicare tax; Feaster received reimbursement of 
$6,764 for his expenses. 
 
 Even though he received his regular W-2 form, Feaster 
filed his 2006, Form 1040, federal income tax return with a 
Schedule C attached; Feaster claimed that he was an 
independent contractor entitled to deductions for car, office, 
travel and meal and home office expenses. In an explanatory 
note concerning the forms and schedules filed, Feaster 
indicated that his self-employment tax had been partially paid 
by one of his clients, Langer, and that that same client deducted 
the necessary Social Security and Medicare tax.  
 
 The Internal Revenue Service issued a notice of 
deficiency against Feaster indicating that he was neither a 
statutory employee nor an independent contractor.  
 
 The Tax Court in this case closely followed the 
reasoning of the Rosato decision. After noting that Feaster did 
not claim he was a statutory employee, the court indicated that 
Langer’s control over Feaster’s work sufficed: the accountant’s 
job description, the acceptance of employer guidelines 
concerning case time limits, frequency of submissions, charges 
to the customer, submission of itineraries and case closings 
signified constant employer supervision. Feaster had indicated 
that he was not very good about communicating with Langer 
and Langer never objected to this failure. But the employer had 
either controlled, or had power to control, its employee.  
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The other elements used to determine whether or not 
Feaster qualified as an independent contractor also clearly 
indicated that he was a common law employee under the 
control of the parties. The perception of the parties was clearly 
indicated in the employment agreement under the issuance of 
Form W-2 during the entire course of Feaster’s employment. 
Although Feaster had to supply his own internet service and at 
times worked out of his home, his investment in the business 
was not considerable because he was reimbursed for hotel, 
meal and vehicle mileage and he had no possibility of 
individual profit or loss. Langer also provided health insurance, 
life insurance and retirement plan benefits which were 
available even if not used by Feaster. Feaster also received an 
hourly wage subject to an increase or decrease depending upon 
his performance – he was paid by the time he worked, and not 
by the cases he completed. Feaster’s work was part of the 
principal’s regular business and the accountant worked for an 
extended period of time so that the employment was 
considered to be permanent. In addition, Langer, the principal, 
possessed the power to discharge Feaster at any time. 
 
 The taxpayer, then, had the obligation to use Schedule 
A for the declaration of unreimbursed business expenses and 
did not have the right to use Schedule C in order to amplify 
those expenses. 
 
Robinson v. Commissioner14 
 
 The Robinson decision and the Hathaway15 
determination, which follows, held that a college professor and 
a traveling sales representative for a clothing manufacturer 
could properly be designated as independent contractors. Both 
of these individuals, then, could use the expanded benefits for 
the declaration of business expenses available under Schedule 
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C, but were obligated to pay self-employment and other taxes 
associated with such designation.  
 
 Robinson worked as a full time criminal justice 
professor for Rowan University, located in southern New 
Jersey. At the same time he held a position at Temple 
University in Philadelphia as an adjunct professor: he was a 
vocational instructor in its Criminal Justice Training Program, 
a non-credit course of studies required by Pennsylvania state 
law for Pennsylvania police officers and other criminal justice 
personnel. Robinson was not responsible for managing the 
enrollment of his classes, but at the same time bore no risk of 
loss for under enrollment, nor the possibility of earning a 
profit. Topics he taught were mandated by the State of 
Pennsylvania; Temple supplied Robinson with those topics, but 
Robinson many times wrote or edited the entire curriculum 
which then became the property of Temple University.  
 
 From 1985 to 1996 Temple treated Robinson as an 
independent contractor and supplied him with Form 1099-
MISC Miscellaneous Income statements for his income tax 
return. After this time Temple began to treat Robinson as an 
employee and report his income on Form W-2. Robinson 
requested the university to treat him as an independent 
contractor, but the university refused.  
 
 Temple did not supply Robinson with an office and 
Robinson completed his Temple assigned work in his home 
office. Prior to the tax year 2004 Robinson had filed Form 
1040 with a Schedule C attached; in a dispute with the Internal 
Revenue Service about one of these prior tax returns, the 
Service had stipulated that Robinson had no deficiency for the 
tax year in issue, without determining that Robinson was an 
independent contractor. For the tax years 2004 and 2005 
Robinson continued to file Form 1040 with a Schedule C 
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attached, but did not file the 2004 return until 4-19-07 and the 
2005 return until 6-13-07. 
 
 On the 2004 Schedule C, Robinson and his market 
company manager wife claimed income of $1,795 and 
expenses totaling $25,164 relating to Robinson’s services to 
Temple. On the 2005 Schedule C, Robinson and his wife 
claimed income of $4,045 and expenses totaling $26,825 from 
Robinson’s work at Temple.16 In late 2007, the IRS mailed 
letters to Robinson and his wife in order to indicate that their 
2004 and 2005 tax returns would be examined.  
 
 At the examination, Robinson provided no 
documentation substantiating his reported expenses, although 
Robinson did continue to indicate that he should be treated as 
an independent contractor. The Service determined that 
Robinson was a common law employee but the Tax Court 
reversed this determination.  
 
 As in all decisions dealing with this matter, the Tax 
Court examined a number of relevant factors to determine 
whether Robinson acted as an independent contractor in his 
instructor work for Temple University. These same nine factors 
were discussed in detail in the Rosato decision above: degree 
of control; perception of the parties; work facilities investment; 
individual profit or loss; employee benefits; payment by job or 
by time; regular business activity; permanency of relationship; 
power to discharge. 
 
 The court observed that an adjunct professorship such 
as Robinson’s position at Temple usually involves the 
university assignment of the courses to be taught and where to 
teach them. Robinson’s duties at Temple, however, were 
similar to other situations17 in which schools hired professors 
to teach in somewhat independent non-credit programs: 
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Robinson’s work as a vocational instructor in a non-credit 
criminal justice training program. Robinson wrote course 
materials and syllabi for topics supplied by the state of 
Pennsylvania, which paid Temple University for the courses. 
The university did set time deadlines for the completion of the 
work, but did not exercise control over how Robinson 
completed the work. The control test suggests that Robinson is 
an independent contractor.  
 
 The perception of the parties clearly indicated that 
Temple University considered Robinson a common law 
employee when it began to issue him W-2 forms beginning in 
1996; but Robinson had formally been treated as an 
independent contractor and contended that he continued to 
operate independently. In addition, the university did not 
provide Robinson with any office space in which to write and 
update course materials so that Robinson’s work facilities 
investment could have included a home office. Robinson’s 
individual profit or loss would stem not only from the 
enrollment success of the courses which he taught but also 
from the expert testimony and other criminal justice training 
course opportunities which would result from his work. 
Robinson also received no employee benefits from Temple, 
reinforcing his independent contractor status. Although 
Robinson was paid by the hour for his teaching duties, his fee 
for writing suggests an independent contractor relationship 
with Temple. Since the university is not a police training 
academy, Robinson’s work of teaching non-credit courses to 
police officers through contracts with the state of Pennsylvania 
is not an essential part of Temple’s regular business. Although 
Robinson taught in the criminal justice training program for 
many years, his employment during the tax years 2004 and 
2005 were minimal and the relative permanence of the work 
relationship is also arguably minimal. Because Robinson’s 
contracts with Temple were not provided, it is difficult to 
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determine whether or not the principal could discharge its 
alleged employee. Several letters during 2004 and 2005, 
however, indicate that Robinson was hired by the university 
separately for individual jobs during each year. Temple’s 
recourse, therefore, would be to not hire him for future 
projects, but the university would not have the power to 
discharge him in the midst of his duties.  
 
 Despite his status as an independent contractor, 
however, Robinson’s Schedule C claims for expenses were not 
allowed due to his tremendously inadequate record keeping. 
Robinson provided no receipts or invoices, but only some 
cancelled checks and credit card statements which did not give 
any details about the items purchased or the expenses incurred 
for other matters.  
 
 Due to his inaccurate filings, Robinson was held 
responsible for accuracy related penalties under IRC Sec. 
6662(a).18 
 
Hathaway v. Commissioner19 
 
 Hathaway began working as a traveling sales 
representative in 1969. During the tax years 1989 and 1990, the 
years in issue in this case, Hathaway worked for The Apparel 
Group, Ltd. (TAG). TAG manufactured clothing and its 
wholesale distribution and retail sale. Hathaway assisted in the 
distribution of men’s clothing to retail customers during fall 
and spring sales seasons. Hathaway and twenty-two other sales 
representatives were experienced professionals, most of whom 
had been working for TAG for more than twenty years.  
 
 Each representative had his own exclusive territory. If a 
sales representative made a sale outside of the assigned 
territory, the sales representative to whom the territory was 
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assigned would receive the commission. Early in 1990 and 
during the tax years in question, Hathaway’s sales territory 
included North Carolina, South Carolina, Wyoming and parts 
of Minnesota; he traveled throughout these this territory but 
also maintained showrooms where he solicited sales.  
 
 TAG gave no sales training to Hathaway. He and the 
other representatives used their own creativity and experience. 
They changed their methods and used their own business 
judgment to effectuate sales and to schedule their time. In 
addition, TAG provided no customer leads nor were the 
representatives required to report on leads to TAG. TAG did 
have two sales meetings each year but did not require the 
representatives to attend. This company’s sales procedure 
manual detailed ways in which orders were to be placed with 
TAG and did request representatives to submit their schedules, 
but these provisions were not followed; the manual also 
reserved sales cancellation rights to TAG, but TAG always 
accepted the representatives recommendations in this regard.  
 
 Hathaway communicated with TAG minimally 
throughout the time of his work for the company: he sent his 
orders on a scratch pad which were then documented on TAG 
forms. Credit reports were required but no other type of report 
was used. Otherwise, Hathaway reported to TAG on an 
irregular basis. He spoke by phone from time to time to the 
company’s national sales manager, who did have final approval 
when a special sales arrangement was made with a major 
company.  
 
 TAG paid its representatives on a commission basis and 
permitted a draw against the previously earned commission’s 
reserve. TAG issued Forms W-2 to Hathaway in the amounts 
of $102,837.28 in 1989 and $129,283.05 for 1990; federal 
income taxes and Social Security (FICA) taxes were withheld. 
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Hathaway also participated in the TAG pension plan and the 
company provided him with disability, life and medical 
insurance benefits.  
 Hathaway’s expenses for the tax years in question were 
considerable: he and other representatives had to pay their own 
travel, lodging, telephone and food expenses; a portion of his 
moving expenses, a percentage of advertising expenses and for 
any other materials besides order forms, swatch cards and 
preaddressed envelopes. Hathaway spent approximately $2,000 
per year on the tools of his trade such as sample cases, business 
cards and stationery.  
 
 Hathaway also had to maintain his own business 
quarters, one in his home in Iowa and the other in a Minnesota 
mall. The business quarters included an office space with desk, 
computer, printer, bookshelf system, fax machine, copying 
machine and filing cabinets. His quarters also had a showroom 
with display tables and full glass racks to exhibit TAG 
merchandise. Hathaway also had to employ order writers and 
people to assist him at apparel shows.  
 
 If the costs of Hathaway’s work in soliciting sales were 
greater than the commissions generated then Hathaway would 
have operated at a loss; he would also have suffered a loss as 
the result of his guaranteeing the credit of a purchaser on an 
account, which he did from time to time at the request of the 
company.  
 
 In addition, during 1989 and 1990, Hathaway handled 
noncompeting merchandise for a glove company for which he 
received commissions. Even if Hathaway were terminated by 
the company, he would retain commissions on eighty-five 
percent of unshipped orders. TAG would retain the other 
fifteen percent to cover the costs of orders that may later be 
cancelled for credit or other reasons.  
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 The Tax Court held that Hathaway was an independent 
contractor in 1989 and 1990 and had the right to use Form 
1040 Schedule C; he would not, however, be subject to 
unemployment taxes because of the amounts already paid by 
TAG.  
 
 The court reasoned that a taxpayer’s independent 
contractor or common law employee designation is a question 
of fact which must be determined in accord with the nine 
criteria already mentioned. The opinion is remarkable for 
explicitly indicating which of the criteria argue for independent 
contractor or common law employee status.  
 
 TAG’s degree of control over Hathaway was indicated 
as the single most important factor in determining Hathaway’s 
independent contractor status. The court had to consider not 
only what actual control was exercised but what right of 
control practically existed. The court concluded that TAG did 
not control, nor have the right to control, Hathaway’s actions: 
means or results of solicited sales; sales training; sales leads or 
sales reports. The statements in the sales procedure manual 
were “toothless”20 as none of the procedures described in it 
were ever enforced, except for certain requirements about the 
placing and cancellation of orders. The TAG national sales 
manager supervision requirement, furthermore, was so limited 
and rare as to be inconsequential: it came into effect only when 
a special sales negotiation occurred with major companies.  
The court also rejected TAG’s contention that the assignment 
of exclusive sales territories amounted to control as far as the 
sales activity itself was concerned.  
 
The other criteria received a briefer treatment. The perception 
of the parties, gleaned from the evidence of Tax Court 
testimony indicated that Hathaway and sometimes TAG itself 
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considered Hathaway as an independent contractor or 
independent agent. But this testimony is contradicted by the 
fact that Hathaway used Form 1040 Schedule A for many years 
and that TAG issued Forms W-2 and withheld taxes from his 
commissions. The court concluded that the bulk of the 
evidence points to the perception that the parties considered 
themselves as in an employer-employee relationship. The work 
facilities and sales materials and equipment investments were 
so substantial, relative to TAG’s reimbursement, that the court 
had no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that this criterion 
indicated Hathaway’s independent contractor status. As already 
indicated in the factual description of his work, Hathaway’s 
individual opportunities for profit or loss included non-
reimbursement for order losses from merchandise which could 
not be shipped and losses from guaranteeing the credit of a 
customer who failed to pay. The evidence once again indicated 
that Hathaway could claim independent contractor status. TAG 
did provide a pension plan, disability, life and medical 
insurance benefits. Such provisions support a conclusion that 
Hathaway was an employee. The court never explicitly dealt 
with the payment by job or by time criterion, but it is quite 
obvious from the facts that Hathaway received commissions 
from sales jobs completed rather than from time spent in 
negotiating those sales – a factor that would indicate 
independent contractor rather than common law employee 
status. The court did observe that Hathaway’s activity is 
certainly an integral or regular part of TAG’s regular business 
activity; this factor, the court concluded, would again support a 
determination of Hathaway’s status as an employee. Since 
Hathaway had worked for TAG since 1969, the permanency of 
his relationship with TAG would indicate his employee status. 
The court finally observed that TAG’s power to discharge 
Hathaway and Hathaway’s right to leave TAG’s employment 
created an employment at will. TAG’s right, however, does not 
clearly indicate employee status because, from the context, 
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TAG would probably have the same right to discharge an 
independent contractor. This criterion, then, has little impact 
upon a determination of status. 
 The current analysis of the Hathaway case, then, 
indicates that four criteria (control, investment, profit/loss, and 
job/time) argued for independent contractor status and four 
criteria (perception, benefits, regular business, and 
permanency) supported common law employee status. The 
power to discharge criterion was deemed inconclusive by the 
court.21  
 
CONCLUSION: A PLAN OF ACTION 
 
 The Internal Revenue Code, IRS publications and the 
four decisions described above will enable the tax practitioner 
to plan procedures for the practitioner’s benefit and for the 
benefit of the tax client. 
 
 The tax practitioner will receive benefit from 
acquaintance with code provisions concerning the additions 
and penalties for late and inaccurate returns; from IRS 
publications including Publication 15-A concerning the criteria 
used to determine the elements and examples of independent 
contractors, common law employees, statutory employees and 
statutory non-employees; from the Tax Court decisions which 
richly describe the application of the nine criteria to a number 
of professions including accountants, instructors and traveling 
sales representatives. 
 
 Tax clients, including business consultants or advisors, 
will receive benefit from tax professional software and other 
means of communication which assist them to adequately 
judge the need for professional counsel; to keep work records 
by way of computer and other media in day-to-day journals of 
business activity; to apply the nine criteria properly, especially 
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in questions of control, perceptions of the parties by way of 
written agreement and issuance of W-2 forms, and potential for 




                                                 
1 IRC Section 62(a)(2); Section 63(a),(d); Section 67(a),(b); Section 162(a). 
2 IRC Section 55(a). The alternative minimum tax requires that corporations 
and individuals pay a certain minimum which would include the greater 
amount of the regular tax of the tentative minimum tax at 26% of the first 
$175,000 and 28% on all taxable excess.  Section 56(b)(1)(A) provides that 
in computing Alternative Minimum Taxable Income, no deduction will be 
allowed for miscellaneous itemized deductions. 
3 IRC Section 3121(d)(1),(3) defines a statutory employee as any (1) any 
officer of a corporation; or (2) any individual who, under the usual common 
law rules applicable in determining the employer-employee relationship, 
has the status of an employee; or (3) any individual (other than an 
individual who is an employee under paragraph (1) or (2)) who performs 
services for remuneration for any person (A) as an agent-driver or 
commission-driver engaged in distributing meat products, vegetable 
products, fruit products, bakery products, beverages (other than milk), or 
laundry or dry-cleaning services, for his principal; (B) as a full-time 
salesman; (C) as a home worker performing work, according to 
specifications furnished by the person for whom the services are performed, 
on materials or goods furnished by such person which are required to be 
returned to such person or a person designated by him; or (D) as a traveling 
or city salesman, other than as an agent-driver or commission-driver, 
engaged upon a full-time basis in the solicitation on behalf of, and the 
transmission to, his principal (except for side-line sales activities on behalf 
of some other person) of orders from wholesalers, retailers, contractors, or 
operators of hotels, restaurants, or other similar establishments for 
merchandise for resale or supplies for use in their business operations; if the 
contract of service contemplates that substantially all of such services are to 
be performed personally by such individual. 
4 Daniel Feaster v Commissioner, TC Memo 2010-157, 2010 Tax Ct. 
Memo LEXIS 194. Feaster argued that he was an independent contractor 
whose self employment tax has been paid by the business for whom he 
provided auditing services.  
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5 IRS website at www.irs.gov Even common law employees may itemize 
job travel expenses for travel from home to a site other than the employee’s 
usual place of business. 
6 IRS Publication 15-A – Employer’s Supplemental Tax Guide, p.5. 
7 Thomas Rosato, et ux. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2010-39, 2010 Tax Ct. 
Memo LEXIS 40, for a treatment of the common law employee definition; 
this treatment appears in many Tax Court and other cases treating the 
employee status.  
8 IRS Publication 15-A – Employer’s Supplemental Tax Guide, pp.7, 8; 
Weber v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 378 (19940, aff’d, 60 F.3d 1104 (4th Cir. 
1995).  
9 Donald T. Robinson, et ux. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2011-99, 2011 
Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 97; 1 Restatement of Agency, 220 (1958). 
10 IRS Publication 15-A – Employer’s Supplemental Tax Guide, p.6. 
11 TC Memo 2010-39. 
12
 Thomas Rosato, et ux. v. Commissioner, 2010 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 40 
at 9-10. An individual qualifies as a statutory employee under section 
3121(d)(3) only if the individual is not a common law employee pursuant to 
section 3121(d)(2). Section 3121(d) defines “employee”, in pertinent part, 
as follows:  
(2) any individual who, under the usual common law rules 
applicable in determining the employer-employee 
relationship, has the status of employee; or 
(3) any individual (other than an individual who is an 
employee under paragraph (1) or (2)) who performs services 
for remuneration for any person— 
(D) as a traveling or city salesman, other than 
as an agent-driver or commission-driver, 
engaged upon a full-time basis in the 
solicitation on behalf of, and the transmission 
to, his principal (except for side-line sales 
activities on behalf of some other person) of 
orders from wholesalers, retailers, contractors, 
or operators of hotels, restaurants, or other 
similar establishments for merchandise for 
resale or supplies for use in their business 
operations; 
if the contract of service contemplates that substantially all of such services 
are to be performed personally by such individual; except that an individual 
shall not be included in the term “employee” under the provisions of this 
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paragraph if such individual has a substantial investment in facilities used in 
connection with the performance of such services (other than in facilities for 
transportation), or if the services are in the nature of a single transaction not 
part of a continuing relationship with the person for whom the services are 
performed; 
13 TC Memo 2010-157. 
14 TC Memo 2011-99. 
15 Paul E. Hathaway, et ux. v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1996-389, 1996 
Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 409 
16 The Robinson decision concerns the income tax status of both Robinson 
and his wife, but this article concentrates upon Robinson because the Tax 
Court did find that Robinson was an independent contractor, whereas his 
wife was held to be a common law employee. Since this article has already 
examined two decisions which determined that the taxpayer was a common 
law employee, the portion of the Robinson opinion dealing with Robinson’s 
marketing company manager wife is omitted.  
17 Reece v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1992-335, 1992 Tax Ct. Memo 
LEXIS 358, where a full time university professor (a common law 
employee for his full time work) acted as a seminar instructor for an 
executive education program.  For this work, Reece was held to be an 
independent contractor because he designed, led and taught the non-credit 
program, even though the program occurred in classrooms supplied by the 
university. 
18 2011 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 97 at 42-43. 
19 TC Memo 1996-389. 
20 1996 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 409 at 23. 
21 The Hathaway Tax Court, in endnote 7, noted that the Service requested 
that benefits provided by TAG to Hathaway should be taxable as income to 
him if the court determined that Hathaway was an independent contractor; 
this contention however, was not properly pleaded and was not considered 
by the court. 
